Let me be very clear, I support our beleaguered president; he occupies the oval office during what in my estimation is the most difficult, complex and ominous era in world history. I have no doubt that he firmly believes that he is doing the right thing regarding the global war on terror (GWOT). And I’m behind him every step of the way. Even so, it is clear that mistakes have been made at several levels of government and opportunities missed that can now be examined with the passing of time and the luxury of hindsight. This article is not intended to point out failures for the sake of bashing the president or any of our national leaders. It is my small contribution offered as a basis for considering future endeavors in conducting the GWOT. Call it constructive criticism, for that is exactly what it is intended to be.

The next time that we must take the military option in conducting the GWOT, I suggest that our civilian leadership remove itself from the picture in the planning stages and allow the experts, our military leaders to formulate a plan that will maximize the use of our military personnel and equipment to the greatest extent possible. You see, some civilian leaders had the view that the Army had become cumbersome and too slow to get moving and into the action. They thought the Army had become risk averse, afraid of making a mistake. Prior to 9/11, under the guidance of the then Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric Shinseki and the former Secretary of the Army, General (Retired) Thomas White, the Army had embarked on a path of transformation. The goal of this transformation was to turn the Army into an organization able to deploy specialized units of action to a theater more rapidly, an agile, mobile yet lethal smaller force. But transforming an organization as large and steeped in tradition as the Army takes time. After 9/11 time was a luxury the Army no longer had. It became crystal clear; we must take the fight to the enemy, in their backyard. Fortunately, the terrain of Afghanistan allowed us to deploy small teams of Special Forces to guide Air Force, Navy, Marine and Army attack aircraft to their targets. OEF was a rousing victory, the Taliban were routed and Al Qaeda took to their heels trying to make the Pakistan border.

I think the biggest mistake regarding OIF was in not sending enough troops to Iraq initially. The Army, in the process of transformation should have been allowed to fight the war in Iraq under the old doctrine, the doctrine in which our troops were trained, expert at and equipped for instead of being forced to conduct the operation as a way to validate the vision of the new Army our civilian leaders held. It is always better as per the Powell Doctrine that when on the attack you seek numerical advantage over the defender. Further, it is my opinion that it is always favorable to deploy more troops than you need and withdraw them at your leisure as time and mission permit, rather than to send in too few and discover tragically that you should have deployed more, this is the case in Iraq. In testimony before Carl Levin and the Senate Armed Services Committee, after being painted into a corner on the question of how many troops he thought we should deploy, General Shinseki said significantly more, 200,000. This was still under half the number deployed for Desert Storm (in which the writer participated). The Secretary of the Army Thomas White said the same thing, and he was fired from his position shortly thereafter. General Shinseki’s successor was named almost 18 months prior to the end of his term as the Chief of Staff of the Army. Clearly, this was a slap in the face. And when General Shinseki retired, conspicuously absent from the ceremony, was the Secretary of Defense, so, it is clear to me that there was some disagreement at the Pentagon on the issue of how many boots to put on the ground and probably other matters as well. Also, testifying before Carl Levin and the Armed Services Committee, Paul Wolfowitz had this to say about General Shinseki’s troop numbers comment; “wildly off the mark.” Further, he said he “couldn’t conceive of how you would have a case where it takes more people to secure peace than it does to win the war.” Well, I was just a grunt in the Army, but I do read and there is a definite pattern that emerges if one reads enough about military history. It indeed does take more troops to keep the peace then it does to win the war. This axiom was quantified the day looting broke out on the streets of Baghdad, as bewildered Soldiers stood around without clear orders and giddy Iraqis criss crossed the streets with anything they could get their hands on, including important records and documents from government buildings. Records that perhaps contained information on where other bad guys were or who they could contact to get public services back online, records that may have helped speed up the reconstruction effort, where to find military leaders necessary to get the Iraqi Army on the streets to keep law and order. But we didn’t have enough troops to keep order and that is what it boils down to.

The war in Iraq started out well enough. The combat phase was a stunning display of élan by our troops. And lets be honest about this, it was not brilliant planning that brought about the capitulation of Baghdad and overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime. It was the quick thinking, improvisation of our squad to company level leaders. It was the actions of our captains, lieutenants, sergeants and the guts of our Soldiers and Marines on the ground that made it possible.

The intelligence community was faced with a very daunting task with Iraq. I know that erring to the side of caution is good policy. But because intelligence was in essence fed to combat units in Iraq from the top down and often times wrong, our small unit leaders were forced to employ movement to contact tactics which are time consuming and physically exhausting. Intelligence of use to tactical leaders does not come from satellite photographs, it comes from the bottom up and that intelligence is collected and forwarded by radio report by people, by the Special Forces, cavalry scouts, long range patrols and forward observers, we need more of these kinds of units.

When will our civilian leaders learn that General Officers of the United States Military are experts in planning military operations? They may take longer than civilian leadership would like, but if the military is rushed into an operation, or if their efforts are altered by our civilian leaders, one thing is certain; it will result in higher casualty rates and perhaps more collateral damage. From the War in Korea forward, our civilian leaders have become more involved in planning military operations than they ever had in the past and the results are recorded for history. The result is a negotiated end to hostilities and an unsatisfactory outcome that may well re-ignite in the future, just like Iraq did, and Korea probably will. Once our politicians have run the course of diplomacy and military action becomes the last option, they should turn it over to the military and stay out of the way.

Iraq is not a lost cause. The president, Vice President, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, numerous General Officers and more, have stated many times over that this fight could be one that lasts for generations. We can achieve the end state if we will unite in the endeavor, recognize what the stakes of this fight are and steel ourselves and our families for what might come. The only way we will lose this war, is if we allow ourselves to.